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Abstract
This article discusses, models and quantifies the relationship between the
number of parties in government and the degree of policy change or
instability. Single-party governments, such as those formed in the United
Kingdom for several decades, tend to produce very high levels of policy
changes and reversals, whereas multiparty coalition governments, such as
the ones in Switzerland or Israel, tend to produce a high degree of stability
and little policy change. This relationship is studied for 295 elections and
the subsequent governments in twenty-four countries since the Second
World War. According to the study, there is a strong negative correlation
between the number of parties in government and the degree of policy
change. The fewer parties in government the more changes, and vice
versa.
Keywords party system; policy-making; parliamentary regimes
The outcome of the United Kingdomelection in 2010 overturned longsustained beliefs about the virtues
of Westminster-style governance. At
least for a while, the country seemed to
be moving to the kind of multiparty
coalition politics that is more common in
other parliamentary democracies. The new
Prime Minister, David Cameron, said that
the new Conservative-Liberal coalition
government ‘marks a clean break from
the past and a new start for the country’
(media, 25 May 2010). He may have
meant a break with not only the previous
period of Labour party governments, but
with several decades of single-party
governments and significant instability
of major public policies.
The aim of this article is to analyse,
model and quantify the relationship be-
tween the number of parties in govern-
ment and the degree of policy change or
instability. The hypothesis to discuss and
develop is that the higher the number of
parties that participate in government in
a political system, the lower the average
degree of policy change over time.
Single-party governments, such as those
that were formed in the United Kingdom
from the end of World War II to 2010,
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seem to have produced very high levels
of policy changes and reversals. By con-
trast, coalition governments, such as
those formed, for instance, by four parties
in Switzerland since 1959, tend to pro-
duce a high degree of stability and little
policy change. The remarkable difference
in the degrees of policy change over time
between the two countries mentioned
above is represented in Figure 1. The
connection between single-party govern-
ments and high levels of policy instability,
as well as the alternative advantages
for policy continuity provided by coalition
governments, such as those, for instance,
in Germany, have been acknowledged
for quite some time. But there has also
been a lot of conjectures that single-party
governments can be more committed
to responsible policies, while multiparty
coalition governments are vulnerable to
threats and shifts from minor, sometimes
extreme parties, as is frequently argued,
for instance, regarding Israel. Much of
the political, journalistic and academic
discussion about the policy effects of the
different types of party government has
focused on the experience of a few
countries, such as the aforementioned.
In this article, the relationship between
the number of parties in government
and the degree of policy instability is
systematically studied and quantitatively
measured for 295 elections and subse-
quent governments in twenty-four demo-
cratic countries since WWII. The main
analysis focuses on parliamentary and
a few semi-parliamentary regimes, of
which eighteen are in Europe, four in
Asia-Pacific and one in North America,
while a section deals with the United
States’ regime of separation of powers in
a way that could be applied to other
countries with comparable institutional
formulas.
This work was triggered by two major
intellectual contributions. First, the cam-
paign for building theoretically inspired
models that can be empirically tested
and used for predictions within acceptable
margins of error, as promoted and devel-
oped by Rein Taagepera.
According to this approach, empirical
analyses based on logical grounds should
include not only the sign of presumed
statistical relationships between political
and institutional alternatives (as is usually
‘Coalition governments
y tend to produce a high
degree of stability and
little policy change’.
Figure 1 Policy Instability in the United Kingdom and Switzerland.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Budge et al (2001), Kim and Fording (2002), and Klingemann et al
(2006).
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the case in exercises using standard linear
regression techniques), but they should
be able to appraise gradations of effects
and trade-offs among variables in terms of
‘how much’ one can depend on another
and the expected variance of values. This
type of ‘quantitative logical models’
requires some theoretical creativity, but
also good quality data permitting the
appropriate quantitative measurements
(Taagepera, 2008; see also Taagepera
et al, 2007).
Thus, the second contribution that
made this kind of exercise for the current
subject feasible for a large number of
cases was the publication of the most
extensive data set available on the
policies and preferences of parties and
governments, as produced by the Party
Manifesto project led by Ian Budge. This
source provides accurate estimates for
every election and government in a few
dozen democratic countries during the
post-war period, as derived from the
programmes, manifestos and platforms
of parties and governments themselves.
As they are standardised on a scale of
0–100, they permit intra-country, cross-
country and long-term comparisons, as
well as associations with more accessible
quantitative data sources such as for the
numbers of parties (Budge et al, 2001,
enlarged and updated by Klingemann
et al, 2006; Kim and Fording, 2002,
2010).
The analysis developed in this article
confirms the basic relationship: that as
the number of parties in government
increases, the degree of policy instability
decreases. An equation with quantitative
values indicates that in comparison with
the high levels of policy instability in
certain systems with single-party govern-
ments, such as the United Kingdom or
Greece, a series of two-party coalition
governments, such as those in Germany,
can reduce policy instability to about
half, while three, four or more parties in
government, as in Switzerland or Israel,
to about one third. For the United States,
where we find a separation of powers
regime, policy instability is almost the
lowest in the sample, thus confirming and
quantifying the ‘gridlock’ effects of fre-
quent situations of divided government
in a comparative perspective. Hence, the
model provides substantive explanatory
power of the different degrees of policy
instability in different countries with
different party and institutional systems.
On this basis, the discussion of the actual
and expected effects of different types
of government on economic, social and
other variables can advance on solid
ground. As far as the model is empirically
robust, it should also supply some pre-
dictive capacity and support for advice
on the choice of government formulas
and of the rules and institutions that tend
to produce different types of partisan
government.
The next section reviews several
previous contributions on the problem.
The subsequent section elaborates on
the hypothesis. The latter section pre-
sents data and operationalisation, on
which the fifth section builds the model
and its results. The penultimate section
briefly deals with the special case of the
United States. A few comments conclude.
THE STATE OF THE
QUESTION
Seminal analysis of the policy effects of
different types of partisan government
emerged, as suggested above, from
the study of British politics. As presented,
in particular, by Samuel Finer (1975),
‘y as the number of
parties in government
increases, the degree
of policy instability
decreases’.
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single-party governments, which are
typical of parliamentary regimes with
plurality rule electoral systems, are the
scene of ‘adversary politics’. This implies
two major consequences. First, single-
party governments, even if they enjoy
majority seat support in parliament, are
frequently based on only a minority of
popular votes and are strongly socially
biased. In other words, they are more
prone to be captured by minority interest
groups and to implement economic and
social policies not encompassing broad
social preferences. Second, frequent al-
ternations in government of electorally
minority and socially biased parties tend
to produce policy reversals and instability.
As described by Finer, the British sys-
tem, in which the plurality winner takes
all, ‘is one of alternating single-party
government’ in which a single ‘political
party controls all decisions in the House of
Commons’ and ‘can legislate in any way it
desires’. After every election, ‘current
policies may be altered very radically
indeed’, including, for the post-war period
under his scrutiny, steel nationalisation,
trade union regulations, income taxes,
regional, housing, urban, and school po-
licies, fields, among others, in which a
‘number of reversals and re-reversals and
in some cases, re-re-reversals of policy
have occurred’. In contrast, with propor-
tional representation electoral rules and a
multiparty system, ‘each of the major
parties, if it wanted to form a govern-
ment, would have to cooperate with a
party or parties taking a more central
stance’, which would prevent ‘wide swings
in policy’ (Finer, 1975: 3, 13ff, 31; see
also Finer, 1982).
Somehow echoing this early call, a
number of studies have addressed the
relationship between the different types
of partisan government and several policy
features, although usually within more
complex frameworks including other po-
litical and institutional variables. By
using statistical correlations and factor
analysis, Arend Lijphart set an empirical
typology of political regimes based on
degrees of concentration of institutional
and party powers. The ‘majoritarian’ or
Westminster-type includes single-party
governments, while the consensus-type
embraces basically parliamentary re-
gimes with proportional representation
and multiparty coalition governments.
While emphasising the advantages of
consensus regimes for maintaining civil
peace and other performances, Lijphart
remarks, in particular, that alternation of
single-party governments ‘may entail
sharp changes in economic policy that
are too frequent and too abrupt’ (Lijphart,
1999: 59, following Lijphart, 1984). Dig-
ging with these tools, Manfred Schmidt
observed large policy effects of the parti-
san composition of governments in ma-
joritarian regimes, where single-party
governments are the rule, while in con-
sensus democracies with multiparty gov-
ernments and other institutional
constraints ‘the room of policy man-
oeuvre by the government is narrowly
circumscribed’ (Schmidt, 1996).
In a different approach, largely based
on ‘spatial’ measures of policy positions
and preferences, John Huber and Bing-
ham Powell found that multiparty parlia-
mentary governments based on
proportional representation include the
median voter’s preference with higher
frequency than the typical single-party
governments based on majoritarian elec-
toral rules. This may imply that policy
positions of multiparty governments can
remain relatively more stable around a
consensual point. In contrast, single-
party governments are ‘essentially un-
constrained by other parties in the policy-
making process’ (Huber and Bingham
Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000).
By drawing on some findings in game
theory, George Tsebelis produced a
non-dichotomic classification of political
regimes by counting the number of ‘veto-
players’, which in parliamentary regimes
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turns out to be equivalent to the number
of parties in government. He consistently
emphasises that an increase in the num-
ber of ‘veto players’ increases policy
stability, ‘impeding significant departures
from the status quo’, since in order to
change policies, more difficult multiparty
agreements have to be attained (Tsebelis,
1995, 2002).
Finally, Torsten Persson and Guido
Tabellini, focusing on economic policy,
also compared the effects of different
electoral rules and institutional models,
although they did not focus on the
intermediate role of political parties.
They observed that, on the one hand, in
the winner-takes-all model ‘only one
politician or party holds office and is
free to set policy’, which predicts ‘policy
divergence’ between successive gov-
ernments. On the other hand, in the
alternative institutional setting (based
on proportional representation elec-
tions) ‘several politicians are in office
and bargain over policy’, thus producing
higher levels of policy convergence
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
In comparison with these works, the
present exercise is different in two
ways. On the one hand, it simplifies the
analysis by focusing on the policy stabi-
lity effects of the number of political
parties in government. Since the rela-
tionships between the number of parties
and the electoral system and other
institutional variables are well estab-
lished (see, in particular, Colomer,
2005a; Taagepera, 2007), we can adopt
this focus for the sake of parsimony. On
the other hand, this article offers precise
quantitative measurements and a gener-
al equation for the relationship under
study, beyond the customary result
that it works in the expected direction
and is statistically significant. The sub-
sequent effects of policy change on
political, economic and other structural
variables are only briefly discussed in the
final section.
HYPOTHESIS
Two mechanisms can be identified to
explain how the number of political par-
ties in government affects the degree of
stability or change of public policy. One
refers to the allocation of policy issues
within government; the other is related
to multiparty negotiations on some of
these issues.
The first element is related to the
number of policy issues that can be the
subject of policy debate and public
action. In two-party systems, the num-
ber of policy issues in electoral cam-
paigns is lower than in multiparty
systems, as each party can introduce a
limited number of preferred issues in
which it can specialise and expect voters’
favourable inclination and support (for
the relationship between the number
of parties and the number of relevant
issues, see Taagepera and Grofman,
1985). In a two-party system, an elec-
tion may be won by a single party on the
basis of a small set of issues that turn
out to be prominent during the campaign
and in voters’ information driving their
vote. But the election is decisive for
all the multiple policy issues that may
enter the government’s agenda, including
those that may have not been taken
into serious consideration by many voters
at the time of casting their votes. The
subsequent single-party government may
have a free hand to approve and imple-
ment its preferred policies on many issues,
even if they have not been salient in the
previous debate and campaign. The room
for policy manoeuvre by a single-party
government is spacious.
‘The room for policy
manoeuvre by a single-
party government
is spacious’.
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In contrast, in multiparty elections
producing coalition cabinets, each party
can focus on a different set of issues,
globally enlarging the electoral agenda,
the corresponding debate and the parties’
commitment to well-publicised policies.
In the further institutional process,
certain issues can be negotiated in a
way that the party with more intense
preferences on each issue may receive
specialised government portfolios and
see its preferred policy approved (such
as security for Conservatives, finances
for free-market Liberals, education for
Christian-Democrats, social policy or
labour for Social-Democrats, culture for
Regionalists, etc.). The allocation of
portfolios by specialised distribution and
the subsequent policy-making tend to
create enduring political support for the
decisions on each of these issues.
For other major issues (typically includ-
ing macroeconomic, interior and foreign
affairs policies), multiple political parties
may need to negotiate and agree upon
decisions about common policy propo-
sals, which are likely not to be completely
coincident with any of the preferences
of the parties involved, in order to be
supported by a parliamentary majority
and become law. Intermediate agree-
ments between the parties can settle
within relatively moderate, rather ‘centrist’
sets of policy positions, particularly due
to the fact that the higher the number
of parties in the system, the closer
‘contiguous’ parties tend to be located to
each other within the limits of available
policy ‘space’ (as illustrated later in this
article). Also, as some parties may be
pivotal in parliament and be able to form
coalitions with different partners, they
can introduce elements of policy con-
tinuity even if the party composition of
successive governments changes (as is
especially the case for a number of
Liberal, Agrarian, Centrist and Regional
parties in different countries in which
Social, Democratic or Labour parties, on
one hand, and Conservative or Christian-
democratic parties, on the other, may
hold the ride).
Both means of policy-making, by spe-
cialised distribution of issues and by broad
consensus, preclude drastic changes and
induce relative policy stability in the mid or
long term.
DATA AND
OPERATIONALISATION
Two variables are presented here: the
number of parties in government and
the degree of policy change, as shown
in Table 1. First, the absolute number
of parties in government is taken from
Jan-Erik Lane et al (1997) and Wolden-
dorp et al (2000). The country-mean
values range from one (as in Canada,
New Zealand until 1993, Spain and the
United Kingdom) to four or more (as in
Finland, Israel and Switzerland). The
total country-average number of parties
in government for twenty-four countries
is slightly more than two.
Table 1 also presents the mean effec-
tive numbers of parties in government
on the basis of calculations for the 295
elections. While their relationship with
the degrees of government policy change
works in the expected direction and is
statistically significant, it does, however,
show a weaker association than the
absolute number of parties. This may
reflect the power of junior partners in
government to negotiate not only the
distribution of portfolios within gov-
ernment, but also major policy issues
requiring multiparty majority support to
become government policy, as suggested
in the discussion in the previous section.
Besides their influence on specific poli-
cies, political parties within a coalition
government may play a role in checking
and balancing collective decision-making
on the broad set of government policy
issues.
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Table 1: Government parties and policy change
Country Elections No. of parties in government Government policy-ideology
Years Number Absolute Effective Mean Range Change %
Australia 1951–1996 18 1.67 1.39 42.65 67.09 13.68
Austria 1953–1995 14 1.64 1.54 55.24 72.26 17.39
Belgium 1950–1995 15 3.33 3.06 56.83 39.97 9.63
Canada 1953–1997 15 1.00 1.00 50.57 42.26 10.90
Denmark 1950–1994 18 1.94 1.70 56.13 77.85 22.91
Finland 1951–1995 13 4.25 3.16 59.92 46.69 13.14
France 1958–1997 10 2.22 2.00 49.72 42.32 19.44
Germany 1953–1994 12 2.17 1.75 51.08 43.77 12.65
Greece 1974–1996 8 1.25 1.24 54.27 53.17 23.82
Iceland 1953–1995 13 2.23 2.18 43.74 72.21 22.25
Ireland 1951–1997 14 1.57 1.29 46.79 50.63 15.31
Israel 1951–1996 13 4.85 2.44 43.00 23.24 8.75
Italy 1953–1992 12 3.10 1.94 51.45 26.33 5.87
Japan 1960–1993 13 1.50 1.22 57.47 35.20 16.88
Luxembourg 1951–1994 10 2.00 1.98 66.32 29.98 11.05
the Netherlands 1952–1994 13 3.31 2.78 54.90 27.64 11.76
New Zealand 1951–1993 16 1.00 1.00 53.11 52.40 11.05
Norway 1953–1997 12 2.00 1.78 73.12 39.86 9.87
Portugal 1976–1995 9 1.34 1.49 46.48 49.90 26.61
Spain 1977–1996 7 1.00 1.00 60.28 42.50 10.57
Sweden 1956–1994 14 1.57 1.50 70.57 73.23 13.79
Switzerland 1951–1995 12 3.92 3.48 45.46 34.77 7.28
UK 1950–1997 13 1.00 1.00 54.53 71.33 20.77
US 1948–1996 25 1.60 — 52.16 37.65 7.02
Country-average 13.29 2.16 1.82 54.00 48.01 14.27
Notes: Effective number of parties in government ENPG¼1/Ppi2, where p is the proportion of portfolios in government for each party i;
Government policy-ideology (GovtId) is measured on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the farthest rightwing position, and 100 the
farthest leftwing one. Change % is the average difference in Government policy-ideology between every two consecutive elections for all k
election years t (e.g., Ch¼1/kP|GovtIdtGovtIdt+1|).
Sources: Author’s elaboration with data from Lane et al (1997), Woldendorp et al (2000), Budge et al (2001), Kim and Fording (2002, 2010).
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Second, government policy positions
have been collected from the above-
mentioned Party Manifesto Project
sources. In this project, the values allo-
cated to each party and partisan gov-
ernment are the result of encompassing
collection, reading and codification of
party and government programmatic
documents for at least fifty-seven policy
variables, with several leading indicators
based on combinations thereof. Program-
matic emphases are interpreted in accor-
dance with ‘salience’ and ‘valence’ theory
of issues. For instance, left-wing positions
are allocated to those devoted to govern-
ment intervention in the economy, welfare
social policy and peaceful internationalism,
while right-wing positions are associated
with free enterprise, traditional morality
and strong defence. Actually, twenty
dimensional spaces are created for
foreign, regime, socioeconomic (including
macroeconomic, labour, agriculture), post-
materialist, moral-religious, ethnic and
other policies (See Budge et al, 2001,
Tables 3.2, pp. 80–81).
Any measurement of a set of policies
may imply some internal variance
and, thus, different degrees of policy
instability for different issues. But, as
a summary, a standardised scale of
0–100 was created on which an extreme
right-wing party or government would
be scored at 0, and an extreme left-
wing party at 100. The government
‘ideology’ is built as a weighted average
of government policy positions on all the
issues under examination, and given as
GovtId in the tables (Kim and Fording,
2002, 2010).
Certainly, party documents and elec-
toral manifestos are not the same as
actual policies approved and implemen-
ted. Several studies, however, have found
high degrees of fulfilment of pledges for
action taken by political parties that
subsequently entered government, espe-
cially for important policy matters (see
discussion in Budge et al, 2001: 7–8).
In general, a government with majority
seat support is able to push its policy
proposals through parliament, in addition
to controlling the civil service for its
implementation. In fact, it has been
observed that extremely high proportions
of parliamentary laws are initiated by the
government, while about 70–80 per cent
of government bills may become law, on
average, in parliamentary regimes. Some
observable differences would reinforce
the hypothesis presented in this article,
since in regimes with single-party gov-
ernments, the government tends to con-
trol the parliamentary agenda, while in
multiparty regimes the agenda is usually
decided by negotiations involving not only
the parties in government but also the
opposition (see Doring, 1995; Gallagher
et al, 2006: 61–66).
None of the 295 governments selected
has been located on either of the most
extreme positions, 0 and 100, but the
range is very wide: a few right-wing
governments score below 20, as in
Australia in 1951, Iceland in 1974 (the
lowest, at 7.91) and Ireland in 1961, while
some left-wing governments go beyond
90, as in Austria in 1970, Denmark in
1971, Norway in 1973 and Sweden in
1960 (the highest, at 97.97). However,
the average country-mean government
position in twenty-four democratic coun-
tries is located at 54, that is, very near
the centre. Polar cases are Australia,
Israel and Switzerland on the right side
(with mean values below 45) and Norway
‘y a government with
majority seat support
is able to push its policy
proposals through
parliament, in addition
to controlling the civil
service for its
implementation’.
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and Sweden on the left side (with mean
values higher than 70).
The average range of government posi-
tions within a country is 48 percentage
points, which can be interpreted as an
expectation that the most extreme gov-
ernments on both sides will hold a mutual
distance approximately equal to half the
total ideological spectrum (for the gov-
ernments, countries and periods in the
sample). Most interestingly, the range of
government positions within a country
turns out to be inversely correlated to
the number of parties in government. The
widest ranges of government positions
are found in countries with less than two
parties in government, Austria, Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the
lowest values – that is, the most circum-
scribed in their choices – for highly multi-
party governments, such as those in
Israel, Italy (until 1992) and the Nether-
lands. This observation confirms and
even broadens the proposition presented
above: that in multiparty systems, the
distance between government parties
is relatively low, producing coalition
policies around intermediate, moderate
policy positions (linear correlation with
R2¼0.21).
Reliable and complete data on the two
above-mentioned variables are available
for twenty-four countries for a period
of more than fifty years after 1945. On
the basis of these data, I have calculated
the degree of policy change between
each pair of successive elections as the
difference between the subsequent gov-
ernments’ policy-ideology scores. The
values are percentages of change, which
are easily compared across elections and
across countries and intuitively under-
standable as a reference to the maximum
possible policy-ideology distance (which
would have a value of 100).
The mean-country values of policy
change may be somewhat underesti-
mated as a consequence of successive
appointments of the same party formula
after consecutive elections. The capacity
for a party government formula to stay in
power through several elections should
be considered as an element of policy
continuity, which would play in favour
of the corresponding party system. But,
in fact, the proportion of re-elections
is almost exactly the same for single-
party governments and for multiparty
governments (62 and 60 per cent respec-
tively).
The average policy change between
two successive elections in all the coun-
tries is about 14 per cent. The highest
stability is observed, obviously, for re-
elected single-party governments with
the same prime minister, such as those
of the National Party in New Zealand in
the 1950s and the Conservatives in
Greece in the 1980s, but also for some
lasting multiparty coalitions, such as
those led by Christian-Democrats in
Belgium and in Italy, which eventually
became frozen in their policies. On the
other hand, the highest levels of change
are found in Denmark in 1973 (when
a long period of Social Democratic-led
governments was momentarily inter-
rupted by an Agrarian-Liberal prime min-
ister) and in the United Kingdom in 1979
(when a very leftist Labour government,
scoring more than 90 in 1974, was
replaced with a very rightist one, scoring
around 26 in 1979 and around 19 in
1983).
THE MODEL
The two basic variables in our analysis,
number of parties in government and
degree (or percentage) of policy change,
are plotted in Figure 2 for twenty-three
country-mean values reflecting their
basic institutional relationship (leaving
aside, for the moment, the case of the
US). Roughly speaking, the data suggest
that for single-party governments, we
should expect between 20 and 27 per cent
josep m. colomer european political science: 2011 9
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of policy change in an average election
(which means that it can be much higher
when party alternation in the prime minis-
tership occurs, and very low in relatively
frequent re-elections). There are a few
deviant cases, namely three countries with
single-party governments, Canada, New
Zealand (until 1993) and Spain, which
show low values of policy change. But
generally, the degree of policy change
seems to be reduced to values of between
10 and 20 per cent for two-party coalition
governments and below these figures for
three or more parties in government.
The relationship does not appear linear,
as an increase in the number of parties
in government tends to produce a reduc-
tion in policy change, but at a decreasing
rate. A division function may, therefore,
account properly for this kind of relation-
ship, such as:
y ¼  a
x
In this case, the independent variable,
x, is the number of parties in government.
Let us call it NPG. The dependent variable,
y, is the average degree of policy change.
Let us call it Ch:
Ch ¼ 1=k
X
jGovtIdt GovtIdtþ1j
ð1Þ
where GovtId is the ideology (or weighted
average of policy positions) of each gov-
ernment for all k election years t.
Hence, I hypothesise a relationship of
the type: Ch¼a/NPG. In order to find
the appropriate value for a, I attempt to
make an estimate with the arithmetic
means of NPG and Ch. This can work,
given that all values are positive (no zero
score is found for Ch, even if theoretically
possible), and the ratio of the largest
to the smallest values for both variables
is about 5.1 The arithmetic mean of NPG
is 2.16, and the arithmetic mean of Ch is
14.58, thus making an estimate for a¼
2.1614.58¼31.5. This value can easily
be rounded down to about 30 (taking
into account, in particular, that the few
deviant cases mentioned above have
Figure 2 Country-mean values.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data as for Figure 1.
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lower values than expected). Thus, I
propose the following equation:
Ch ¼ 30%
NPG
ð2Þ
where Ch is the mean percentage of
government policy change between two
successive elections (with the minimum
and maximum values 0 and 100 being
those found for twenty-four democracies
in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury), and NPG is the number of parties in
government.
The equation is valid for 87 per cent
of the countries (20 out of 23) within
a factor of two, as shown in Figure 3.
(It is also valid for 70 per cent of the
countries within a factor of 1.5; the
average deviation between the model
prediction and the actual empirical
values is 1.48.2) The equation, the
country values and the fit area are
plotted in Figure 3. This result, there-
fore, strongly supports the hypothesis
that the higher the number of parties
in government, the lower the degree of
policy change in successive elections.
As suggested as an outstanding
example at the beginning of this article,
Switzerland shows a very low level of
policy instability (about 7 per cent). This
is obviously the result of having had the
same four-party coalition in government
for more than fifty years, including the
Radicals, the Conservative-Christians,
the Socialists and the Populists (with an
annually rotating chair). But it is worth
noting that the lowest level of policy
change is found in Italy for the period
1952–1993 (at less than 6 per cent).
This experience during the so-called First
Republic has been criticised sometimes
for its cabinet instability. The present
result confirms that frequent rotation of
persons in ministerial offices was the
other side of tremendous policy stability
of a succession of governments led by
the Christian-Democrats in coalition with
several partners, including the Socialists,
the Republicans, the Liberals and the
Social Democrats, with an average of
more than three parties in government.
Very low levels of policy instability are
also found for Israel (below 9 per cent),
even though the party composition of
Figure 3 Fit of Equation (2) for 23 democratic countries 1945–1997.
Source: Author’s elaboration with data as for Figure 1.
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successive governments changed to some
extent, with an average partnership of
almost five parties.
Within country comparisons are less
accessible with the available data. How-
ever, several recent cases clearly show
that the direction of the effects of change
in institutional rules and the type of
party government works in the expected
direction. In two cases, a plurality-based
electoral system producing single-party
governments was changed in 1994 in
favour of mixed systems with propor-
tional representation rules that have
induced multiparty coalition govern-
ments. Accordingly, the degree of policy
instability in the following two and three
elections for which we have data has
decreased: from 16.88 to 12.74 in New
Zealand and from 11.05 to 5.17 per cent
in Japan (in spite of a previous long
period of single-party dominance by the
Liberal-Democrats). In Italy, a temporary
move in the opposite direction, from pure
proportional representation to a mixed-
majority electoral system, also produced
the expected result of an increase in
policy instability in the following three
elections from 1994 on (from 6.57 to
30.40 per cent). Further observations
should be able to confirm these tenden-
cies and refine values (calculations are
performed with the same data sources
as for Table 1).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
A separation of powers’ regime, such as
is found in the United States, requires
different treatment. The Congress and
the Presidency must cooperate for legis-
lating and policy-making, as induced by
the requirement of majority rule for the
former and the veto power of the latter.
Analogously to what is observed in par-
liamentary regimes, if the president’s
party has a sufficient majority of seats in
the assembly, it can legislate and make
policy according to its preferences. But in
situations in which the president’s party
does not have a sufficient majority of
seats in the assembly, it has to negotiate
intermediate policy positions with opposi-
tion parties; wide swings in policy can be
prevented.
The degree of policy change of the
twenty-five president parties from 1948
to 1996, as given as GovtId in the afore-
mentioned sources, is low, at 7.95.
However, two settings can be distin-
guished. If the president’s party has a
majority in Congress, or there is ‘unified
government’, I initially assume that the
government includes only one party and
the president’s party policy-ideology pre-
vails. In contrast, for situations of divided
government, I count two parties and
take the average between the presiden-
tial government position, GovtId and
the mean congressional policy-ideology,
which is given as ParlId in the above-
mentioned sources. Thus the divided
government position is estimated as:
DGovtId ¼ 1=2jGovtId ParlIdj ð3Þ
where values for ideology (or weighted
average of policy positions) are given
as DGovtId for the divided government
situation, as GovtID for the president’s
party, and as ParlID for the Congress. The
mean degree of policy change will be:
Ch ¼ 1=kuS ðGovtIdt GovtIdtþ1Þ
þ 1=kdS ð1=2jGovtIdt  ParlIdt j
 1=2jGovtIdtþ1  ParlIdtþ1j
ð4Þ
where Ch is the mean percentage of
government policy change between two
successive elections for all ku election
years with successive unified govern-
ments and kd election years with divided
governments.
Although this is a straightforward route,
it may reflect the different kind of inter-
party negotiations and agreements that
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can be reached with two different partisan
configurations of the institutional setting.
(For a more refined model including
the president, the veto legislator and
the median legislator’s positions, see
Colomer, 2005b).
The subsequent values for the twenty-
five elections in the period 1948–1996
are: NPG¼1.6 (which implies a little more
time with divided government than
with unified government) and an even
lower degree of policy change, Ch¼7.02
per cent. This somehow confirms the so-
called ‘gridlock’, ‘deadlock’ or ‘paralysis’
effect of a regime with separate elections
and institutional ‘checks and balances’.
But, of course, this result is an outlier
regarding Equation (2) and the values
represented in Figure 3.
An alternative procedure may consider
the fact that political parties in the US,
given their very high level of personalisa-
tion, are barely comparable with those
in most parliamentary regimes. Then a
higher number of parties could be
counted. For periods of unified govern-
ment, one could also take the average
value between the presidential govern-
ment position and the mean congres-
sional policy-ideology, thus implying
that, in order to legislate, the president
also has to negotiate with the congress-
men of his own party. This assumption
may reflect some real features in the
policy-making process, although it has
been observed that in periods of unified
government the president’s party disci-
pline increases (King and Ragsdale,
1988). With this assumption, the degree
of policy change in the period under
consideration would be even lower, at
5.2 per cent, the lowest in all the
twenty-four countries examined. This re-
sult would approach the values predicted
by Equation (2) above. With fit depending
on how many parties were counted.
For other countries with comparable
regimes of separation of powers and
higher party discipline, such as many in
Latin America, the numbers of parties
can be counted more precisely and the
relationship between different forms of
partisan government and the degree of
policy instability could be more precisely
measured. This may be the subject of
further research.
CONCLUSION
This study has focused on the number of
parties in government (NPG) in parlia-
mentary and semi-parliamentary regi-
mes, which is of course a simplification
for the complexity of multiple actors that
may enter in the policy-making process.
This variable, however, has proved to be
strongly and inversely correlated with
the degree of policy change (Ch) over
time, according to the equation: Ch¼30
per cent/NPG.
Policy change or instability has been
valued differently by different authors
depending on whether they praise more
clear-cutting electoral promises and
executive effectiveness, or broad con-
sensus in decision-making. A number of
studies have tried to address the policy
consequences of different institutional
settings, especially majority or propor-
tional electoral rules and parliamentary
or presidential regimes, on variables such
as economic growth, budget size, fiscal
pressure, public deficit, welfare and social
spending, inflation, unemployment, as
well as civic peace, electoral participation,
political violence, women’s representa-
tion and others. Most of these exercises
have not led to strongly conclusive
results. Indeed socioeconomic results
may heavily depend on other relevant
factors not necessarily correlated with
the political system, such as technology
availability, country size and external
openness. These, in turn, may be corre-
lated to variables such as climate and
natural resources, population and human
capacities. The political-institutional regime
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should be considered to have only
‘remote’ consequences on economic and
social performance, rather than ‘proxi-
mate’ ones (see a survey in Colomer,
2009).
This article implies a different perspec-
tive. By focusing on the intermediate
role of political parties in government, it
casts light on other understudied aspects
of democratic performance. First, the
degree of policy stability, as measured
here, is compatible with somewhat differ-
ent ideological orientations of the policies
in question, which may be correlated
to different socioeconomic and cultural
characteristics of different countries and
to self-reinforcing political processes in
a long-term perspective. But, by itself,
institutionally induced high policy stability
can reduce people’s uncertainty regarding
the future and favour investments in
capital, education and labour productivity
with expected non-immediate returns, as
has been remarked in more structurally
oriented economic studies (see, for ins-
tance, the discussion by Rodrik, 1991).
Perhaps yet more important is the
fact that policy stability can be a positive
factor for democratic consolidation and
people’s degree of satisfaction with the
political system. If the citizenry can
expect only moderate redistributive deci-
sions from government, the policy dis-
tance between electoral winners and
losers on important issues is low, and if
there is broad consensus on some basic
values, people will tend to comply with
higher probability than in situations prone
to sudden drastic changes and recurrent
policy swings. Conversely, if there is a
single absolute winner concentrating
power in government and making policy
at will, the losing and excluded actors
may be motivated to resist complying
and be tempted to break the rules of the
game (see, for instance, the discussion in
Weingast, 1997; Alexander, 2002; and
Colomer, 2010: chapter 8).
This perspective may add an evaluative
dimension to the precedent positive ana-
lysis. But the findings presented in this
article should also be valid for those
sympathising with frequent policy changes
or stronger capacity of governmental reac-
tions to unexpected shocks. An empirical
logical model, such as the one presented
here, should help us understand the
favourable political and institutional condi-
tions for alternative outcomes and facil-
itate choice and advice.
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Notes
1 ‘For nonlinear relationshipsy if the ratio of the largest to the smallest reading (both positive) is less
than 10y the arithmetic mean can be used as a proxy’ for the central tendency (Taagepera, 2008:; see
his discussion in chapter 9).
2 Since this is a division function, giving the error ranges as a multiplication can be equivalent to giving
the error as a sum 7 of some value for an additive function.
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